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Non-Technical Summary 
We examine in this paper whether owner controlled banks or manager controlled 
banks suffered larger losses during the financial crisis. We show that banks 
operating in countries with better shareholder rights and banks with a controlling 
shareholder recorded larger losses during the crisis than banks operating in countries 
with poor shareholder rights and banks without a controlling shareholder. In the 
period before the crisis, however, the owner controlled banks show superior 
performance. 
Both imply that owner controlled banks incurred greater risks compared to manager 
controlled banks in the pre-crisis period. Economically these effects are large. The 
profits of banks owned by a majority shareholder operating in a country with strong 
shareholder rights declined about five times as much during the recent crisis 
compared to widely held banks operating in countries with weak shareholder rights. 
These effects are robust to including a wide variety of regulatory, bank specific and 
country specific variables. We also find that the probability of owner controlled 
banks to receive government assistance during the crisis is significantly higher than 
that of manager controlled banks. 
We obtain the results using a large dataset of OECD banks, for which we collected 
information on ownership concentration. In total, the sample consists of more than 
1,100 banks for 25 OECD countries. In particular, in addition to most listed banks, 
the sample also includes many unlisted credit institutions. We think this is important 
for the broader applicability of the results, since unlisted banks represent the 
majority of banks in most countries around the world. The greater variability in 
ownership and corporate governance structures assists us in identifying the effects of 
governance on bank risk taking. 
The results contradict the popular sentiment that managers took advantage of 
insufficient control by shareholders to obtain compensation packages that 
disproportionately reward short-term risk taking (e.g. OECD, 2009). They do not 
support the idea that aligning the interests of management better with shareholders 
will reduce risk taking of banks. Instead they suggest the opposite. If management is 
better controlled by shareholders, banks may increase their risk taking. Indeed, one 
may be able to interpret the observed compensation schemes before the crisis as 
attempts by shareholders to induce management to increase their risk taking in line 
with the preferences of shareholders. At the same time, weakening the control of 
shareholders over management would not only reduce risk, but may entail 
significant efficiency costs for banks. Privately optimal management compensation 
schemes may not be socially optimal, as they do not take the externality of a higher 
probability of bank failure into account.  
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Wir untersuchen, ob Banken, die von ihren Eigentümern kontrolliert werden, höhere 
Verluste infolge der Finanzmarktkrise erlitten haben als Banken, die von ihren 
Managern kontrolliert werden. Wir zeigen, dass Banken, die in Ländern mit einem 
höheren Investorenschutz ansässig sind, sowie Banken mit einem Großaktionär 
höhere Verlusten hinnehmen mussten als Banken, die in Ländern mit einem 
geringen Investorenschutz beheimatet sind und nicht von einem Großaktionär 
kontrolliert werden. Im Zeitraum vor der Krise haben die Banken, die von ihren 
Eigentümern kontrolliert werden, hingegen eine bessere Performance gezeigt.  
Das deutet darauf hin, dass Banken, die von ihren Eigentümern kontrolliert werden 
höhere Risiken vor Ausbruch der Krise eingegangen sind als Banken, die von ihren 
Managern kontrolliert werden. Ökonomisch betrachtet ist dieser Effekt stark. So 
sind die Profite der Banken, die von einem Großaktionär kontrolliert werden und in 
Ländern mit einem hohen Investorenschutz ansässig sind, infolge der Krise fünfmal 
so stark gesunken wie die Gewinne der Banken, die nicht von einem Großaktionär 
kontrolliert werden und in Ländern mit geringem Investorenschutz beheimatet sind. 
Die Ergebnisse ändern sich nicht, wenn wir für eine Vielzahl regulatorischer, bank- 
und länderspezifischer Variablen kontrollieren. Die Resultate deuten ebenfalls 
darauf hin, dass Banken, die von ihren Eigentümer kontrolliert werden, eher 
Staatshilfe während der Krise erhalten haben als Banken, die von ihren Eigentümern 
kontrolliert werden. 
 
Die Ergebnisse widersprechen der öffentlichen Einschätzung, dass die Manager von 
Banken die unzureichende Kontrolle durch die Eigentümer ausgenutzt haben, um die 
Vergütungssysteme so zu gestalten, dass das Eingehen kurzfristiger Risiken belohnt 
wird (z. B. OECD, 2009). Sie unterstützen auch nicht die Hypothese, dass die 
Risiken einer Bank zurückgehen werden, wenn die Interessen der Manager stärker 
an die Interessen der Eigentümer gebunden werden. Die Resultate deuten im 
Gegenteil darauf hin, dass das Risiko zunehmen wird, wenn die Manager besser 
durch die Eigentümer kontrolliert werden. Vor diesem Hintergrund kann man die 
Vergütungssysteme, die vor der Krise existierten, als Versuch der Eigentümer 
ansehen, dass Risiko der Bank zu erhöhen. Wird die Kontrolle durch die Eigentümer 
gelockert, könnte das nicht nur da Risiko der Banken reduzieren, sondern auch 
beträchtliche Effizienzkosten nach sich ziehen. Aus diesen Gründen sind privat 
ausgehandelte Vergütungsverträge für Manager nicht sozial optimal, da sie die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass eine Bank insolvent wird, nicht berücksichtigen. 
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 “What I think is a much more fundamental question about the structure and the 
short-termism [of remuneration schemes] would probably be by looking at the 
one of the banks that has failed recently. If one of those banks in 2005 decided 
to be more conservative and hold back in their activity, they more than likely 
would have had their CEO and board even replaced in 2006 for failing to take 
advantage of the opportunities, so the structure was one which was one widely 
supported by players, shareholders and everybody.” 
PETER HAHN, FORMER CITIGROUP MANAGING DIRECTOR IN A REPORT TO THE TREASURY 
COMMITTEE OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT  
1 Introduction  
We examine in this paper whether owner controlled banks or manager 
controlled banks suffered larger losses during the crisis. We show that it is 
owner controlled banks that experienced the largest losses. Banks operating in 
countries with better shareholder rights and banks with a controlling shareholder 
recorded larger losses during the crisis than banks operating in countries with 
poor shareholder rights and banks without a controlling shareholder. In the 
period before the crisis, however, the owner controlled banks show superior 
performance. This is consistent with fewer private benefits to managers in those 
banks, but also with higher risk taking before the crisis.2 Overall, the results 
imply that better aligning the incentives of managers with shareholder interests 
will not result in less risk taking by banks as has been suggested by some in the 
recent policy debate on management compensation.3 Further, privately optimal 
contracts that align the incentives of management and shareholders may not be 
socially optimal as these contracts do not take the externality of higher financial 
fragility into account. When devising management compensation schemes, there 
appears to be a trade-off between bank efficiency and bank stability. A contract 
that minimises agency costs may result in socially “excessive” risk taking.  
                                           
2  The result that owner-controlled banks are riskier highlights the importance of controlling 
for risk when estimating the importance of private benefits of management in management 
controlled banks. The results in this paper suggest that risk seems to explain most of the 
difference in performance between owner-controlled banks and manager-controlled banks. 
Hence, it may be problematic to attribute differences in performance entirely to private 
benefits of management in management-controlled banks. 
3  In addition to the quote from the New York Times above, see for example “U.S. eyes bank 
pay overhaul: Administration in early talks on ways to curb compensation across finance,” 
The Wall Street Journal, May 13, 2009 or  “U.S. targets excessive pay for top executives,” 
by David Cho, Zachary A. Goldfarb and Tomoeh Murakami Tse, The Washington Post, 
June 11, 2009; “US SEC proposes say on pay for TARP companies,” by James 
Pehtokoukis, Reuters, July 1, 2009. 
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 Our results are consistent with long-standing agency theoretic arguments of a 
negative relationship between risk taking and shareholder control of 
management. For example Amihud and Lev (1981), Holmstrom and Ricart I 
Costa (1986) and Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) argue that managers avoid 
taking risks due to career concerns and undiversifiable employment risk. 
According to this view, managers may even spend corporate resources to 
diversify their companies’ operational risk to protect their position in the firm. 
They also support the recent findings in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) and 
Beltratti and Stulz (2009), who show that stock price performance during the 
crisis was worse in those banks, in which the incentives of management were 
better aligned with the interests of shareholders. The results contradict popular 
sentiment, also reflected in some policy reports (e.g. OECD, 2009), that in 
weakly controlled banks, managers were able to obtain compensation packages 
that rewarded short term risk taking.  
We use a large dataset of OECD banks, for which we collected information on 
ownership concentration. In total, the sample consists of more than 1,100 banks 
for 25 OECD countries. In particular, in addition to most listed banks, the 
sample also includes many unlisted credit institutions. We think this is important 
for the broader applicability of the results, since unlisted banks represent the 
majority of banks in most countries around the world (see e.g. Gropp and 
Kashyap, 2009 and Table 1). We also think that the greater variability in 
ownership and corporate governance structures will help us to identify the 
effects of governance on risk taking. 
We estimate the average performance before the crisis during 2000 to 2006 and 
the deviation from this average performance during the crisis as a function of 
shareholder rights and ownership concentration. We find that owner-controlled 
banks tend to perform better on average before the crisis compared to manager-
controlled banks and that owner controlled banks experienced larger losses in 
the crisis than manager-controlled banks. One innovation of this paper is to use 
realized losses during the crisis relative to average performance in calm times as 
a proxy for the risks that were incurred before the crisis. We claim that this 
approach addresses some of the measurement problems frequently encountered 
when attempting to measure bank risk.4  
Relying on the literature (Kose et al., 2008, Laeven and Levine, 2009), we use 
two proxies for the degree to which management is controlled by shareholders: 
Ownership concentration (a bank specific variable) and shareholder rights (a 
country specific variable). Concentrated ownership may help in controlling 
                                           
4  For example, standard accounting measures, like problem loans or loan loss reserves, tend 
to be backward looking and limited to on-balance sheet risk; stock price volatilities are 
limited to listed banks, which constitute only a minority among banks in the OECD (Gropp 
and Kashyap, 2009 and Table 1). 
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 management, as large blockholders may posses more ability and greater 
incentives to monitor management compared to dispersed shareholders (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986).5 Better shareholder rights may enable even dispersed 
shareholders to control management, for instance through calling extraordinary 
meetings or through the ability to take legal action against management (La 
Porta et al., 1998, 1999). 
Theory would tell us that dispersed shareholders have larger incentives to 
increase risk compared to large blockholders, because they are more diversified 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985 and Esty, 1998).6 Large blockholders have greater 
ability to affect bank performance and bank risk-taking, but it is more difficult 
for them to diversify their holdings. In addition, large blockholders may try to 
protect private benefits in the firms that they control (Morck et al., 2005, Stulz, 
2005). Hence, the effect of large blockholders on bank risk taking is ambiguous 
ex ante. On the other hand, the effect of stronger shareholder rights on risk 
taking is unambiguous. Stronger shareholder rights enable even dispersed small 
shareholders to exercise better control of management.  
We find that shareholders prefer more risk relative to managers irrespective of 
whether we measure owner control using shareholder rights or ownership 
concentration. For large blockholders, the ability to control management seems 
empirically to be more important than the risk reducing effect of lack of 
diversification. The results are consistent with Saunders et al. (1990) for banks, 
John et al. (2008) for non-financial firms and Laeven and Levine (2009) for 
banks.7 The evidence shows that bank managers prefer less risk compared to 
owners, whether dispersed or concentrated. The results are robust to controlling 
for differences in regulation and supervision across countries as suggested by 
Laeven and Levine (2009), a host of other legal variables as in Caprio et al. 
(2007) and differences in profits smoothing (Leuz et al., 2003). We also find that 
owner controlled banks are significantly more likely to receive government 
assistance during the crisis, again irrespective of how we measure the ability of 
owners to control management. 
We test and control for the endogeneity of the ownership structure of banks as 
originally suggested by Demsetz (1983). He argues that the ownership structure 
of a firm is an endogenous outcome of a competitive selection process in which 
various advantages and disadvantages of different degrees of ownership 
                                           
5  They may, however, extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
6  See also Burkart et al., 2003. 
7  To our knowledge only Gorton and Rosen (1995) and Knopf and Teall (1996) find the 
opposite, namely that manager controlled banks make the riskiest and most unprofitable 
investment.  
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 concentration are balanced. The results suggest that different levels of 
ownership concentration are consistent with value maximisation (Stulz, 1988; 
Morck et al., 1988 and Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001).  
The estimates suggest an economically substantial effect of governance on 
performance and risk taking: A bank whose largest shareholder owns less than 
10 percent and who is headquartered in a country with poor shareholder rights is 
estimated to have an 2000 to 2006 average ROE of 6.3 percent. In 2008, the 
ROE was 5 percentage points lower. In contrast, a bank headquartered in a 
country with strong shareholder rights and where the largest shareholder owns 
75 percent of the shares would have an average 2000 to 2006 ROE of 30.1 
percent and the 2008 ROE would be 31 percentage points lower, i.e. a ROE of 
minus one percent.  
The literature suggests a number of reasons why agency problems in financial 
institutions may be particularly important and strong shareholder rights alone 
may not be sufficient to control managers. For example, Prowse (1997), Macey 
and O’Hara (2003) and Levine (2004) argue that due to the high level of 
regulation, principal-agent problems may be more severe in the banking sector 
than in other sectors. Banking regulations restrict the ability of the market for 
corporate control to discipline banks (Prowse, 1995), as hostile take-overs in 
many countries are explicitly discouraged.8 Existing management tends to be 
protected by regulations on entry, mergers, takeovers and administrative rules 
(Cheng et al., 1989; Prowse, 1997). Further, deposit insurance may aggravate 
agency problems, since it increases the incentive of shareholders to engage in 
excessive risk-taking (Prowse, 1997; Macey and O’Hara, 2003). Agency 
problems may also be exacerbated by the opacity of banks (Morgan, 2002 and 
Levine, 2004). Opacity creates additional difficulties for shareholders and debt 
holders to monitor the behaviour of managers and to design contracts that align 
the objectives of managers and shareholders. Intervention by large shareholders 
is also less likely if firms are opaque, because the information costs that have to 
be incurred to understand the institution may be higher (Kahn and Winton, 
1998). Seen in this light, the extremely generous performance based 
compensation packages given to bank managers may be interpreted as an 
attempt by shareholders to induce management to increase risk taking.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the data and 
some descriptive statistics on ownership structures, performance and the losses 
                                           
8  For example, the Bundesbank warns against hostile takeovers of large German banks, 
because “an unfriendly takeover of a big bank could create problems of financial stability”, 
Reuters, April 30, 2007. Furthermore, during the crisis of Société Générale in 2008 the 
French Prime Minister Francois Filion warned that the government “will not allow Société 
Générale to be the target of hostile raids by other companies”, Bloomberg, January 29, 
2008.  
 4
 in 2008 among OECD banks. The econometric model and the definitions of the 
main variables used in the regression are presented in Section 3 and our baseline 
results in Section 4. In Section 5, we test whether our results hold if we control 
for bank characteristics. In Section 6 and 7, we check whether they are robust to 
the inclusion of bank regulatory and other country variables. Section 8 examines 
whether the results are driven by profit smoothing and shows that owner 
controlled banks were more likely to require government assistance during the 
recent crisis. Section 9 concludes.   
2 Data and Econometric Model 
2.1 Data  
We use a new dataset on the ownership structure of large banks in 25 OECD 
countries to test our hypotheses. Information on bank shareholders comes from 
the BankScope (2009) database of Bureau van Dijk. Virtually all of our data on 
ownership structure are for 2007 and 2008 though we also occasionally use 
observations from 2005 and 2006. However, since ownership patterns tend to be 
relatively stable over time, we do not view this as a serious shortcoming (La 
Porta et al., 1998, 1999 and Caprio et al., 2007). BankScope is also the source of 
balance sheet information. We only include banks that are larger than 1 billion 
in total assets in 2006. We also require that we have at least three observations 
over the period between 2000 and 2006 and information on bank performance in 
2008. There is some survivorship bias here, as our empirical approach requires 
that banks survive as an entity until 2008. We checked whether there were any 
banks that satisfy the size criterion and the criterion of at least three observations 
in 2000 to 2006, but are without information for 2008. We were unable to 
identify a single bank. In our view this is a reflection of the fact that our dataset 
only contains relatively large banks. In case of serious problems, these banks 
tend to be either bailed out by the government or merged with another bank. 
Hence, in order to address this issue head-on, in Section 8 we also estimate the 
probability that a bank received some form of government assistance as a 
function of governance variables. 
The dataset includes 1,142 banks of which 475 are listed and 667 are unlisted. 
To our knowledge this is the first paper on bank corporate governance that 
includes unlisted banks.  The regional distribution of banks is reported in Table 
1. Most banks are located in the U.S. (317), France (126), Japan (103) and 
Germany (95). The distribution of banks by specialization is reported in Table 2. 
Most banks are classified either as commercial bank (526) or as bank holding 
company (233), but we also have savings banks (95), cooperative banks (92), 
investment banks (68), mortgage banks (60) and different types of state banks in 
our sample. The sample, hence, represents a broad snapshot of large banks in 
OECD countries.  
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 2.2 Econometric Model and Main Variables 
We are interested in the relationship between bank performance, bank risk and 
the strength of shareholder control of management. Ownership and management 
structures are highly persistent and do not respond to annual changes of 
performance (Zhou, 2001 and Caprio et al., 2007). Using a panel estimator with 
fixed effects or first differences may, hence, result in spurious correlation 
between ownership structure and performance (Zhou, 2001). This eliminates the 
merits of using a panel (Caprio et al., 2007). Furthermore, with rational 
managers maximising expected long-term self-interest, it is not clear whether 
small annual changes in ownership are indicative of notable changes in 
managerial incentives that are likely to lead to substantive annual changes in 
performance (Zhou, 2001). As managers are usually with a bank for many years, 
their incentives depend on the link between their expected long-term self-
interest and the bank’s expected long-term performance. Hence, the relationship 
between ownership structure, risk and performance is likely to be a cross-
sectional phenomenon (Zhou, 2001). For these reasons, we estimate the 
following equations for bank performance (1) and bank risk (2):  
0 1 2i i cRoE STAKE RIGHTS X iα α α= + + + Α +ε
i
,      (1) 
and 
0 1 2i i cDROE STAKE RIGHTS BX uβ β β= + + + +       (2) 
iRoE  is the average performance of bank i during 2000 to 2006 and  the 
deviation from average ROE in 2008. DROE is defined as
iDROE[ ]RoERoE −− 20081 . It 
can be interpreted as 1 plus the percentage point drop-off in profits in 2008 
relative to the long run average. Hence, a positive coefficient in equation (2) 
corresponds to larger losses in 2008. Α and B are vectors of coefficients. X 
represents a set of control variables explained below. iε  and  are the error 
terms. The variables of interest are STAKE and RIGHTS.  
iu
In line with the literature, STAKE is defined as the size of the largest ownership 
block and measures the level of ownership concentration in bank i (Glassman 
and Rhoades, 1980; Cole and Mehran, 1998; Caprio et al., 2007 and Laeven and 
Levine, 2009). The largest ownership block is defined as the largest direct or 
indirect stake owned by an individual shareholder or a group of shareholders. A 
direct stake involves shares registered in the shareholder’s name, while indirect 
ownership involves bank shares that are held by entities that are controlled by 
the ultimate shareholder. We follow Caprio et al. (2007) and Laeven and Levine 
(2009) and set every direct and indirect ownership stake below 10 percent to 
zero. The 10 percent threshold is widely used in the literature (La Porta et al., 
1999 and La Porta et al., 2002) and differentiates between widely-held manager-
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 controlled banks and banks that have a concentrated ownership structure and 
may therefore be more likely to be controlled by their shareholders.   
The relationship between STAKE and iRoE  is not clear a priori. If large 
shareholders have greater incentives and are better able to control managers than 
minority shareholders, the relationship between ownership concentration and 
bank performance should be positive as agency costs and private benefits to 
management are reduced (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). However, large 
shareholders may also have the incentive to extract benefits at the expense of the 
other (minority) shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This could reduce 
long term performance of the bank. 
Theory tends to suggest a positive relationship between shareholder 
concentration and risk (DROA). Career concerns (Amihud and Lev, 1981), non-
diversifiable human capital risk (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and private 
benefits of control (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985 and Kane, 1985) all would result in 
shareholders preferring more risk compared to managers. However, the ability 
of shareholders to diversify may matter. If large blockholders are unable to fully 
diversify, they would not necessarily be interested in more risk than managers. 
In addition, large shareholders may want to protect private benefits by reducing 
risk taking (Stultz, 2005)  Ultimately, which effect dominates is an empirical 
matter (John et al., 2008). 
Our second proxy for the degree to which managers act in the interest of bank 
owners is RIGHTS. RIGHTS is an index of anti-director rights taken from La 
Porta et al. (1999). It is commonly used in the literature to measure the level of 
investor protection (Caprio et al., 2007 and Laeven and Levine, 2009). It is 
measured at the country level. If shareholder rights are stronger, even dispersed 
shareholders are able to exercise better control over management. If this reduces 
the ability of management to extract private benefits, we would expect a positive 
relationship between RIGHTS and iRoE . Similarly, if shareholders push for 
greater risk-taking to increase their return on investment, we would also expect a 
positive relationship between RIGHTS and risk (DROE). In particular, minority 
shareholders may have an incentive to increase risk, given that they are able to 
fully diversify firm-specific risk (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The effect of 
RIGHTS on risk may, therefore, be larger than the effect of STAKE.9 
                                           
9  Kose et al., 2008 argue that there is an indirect effect of RIGHTS on risk taking that 
operates through ownership concentration. In countries with strong shareholder protection 
there are fewer benefits to having dominant shareholders. This may have the consequence 
that management has more discretionary power and ultimately result in less risk taking. 
Hence, in all our regressions we control for ownership concentration when examining the 
effect of shareholder rights on risk and we also control for the endogeneity of ownership 
concentration using an instrumental variable approach (see Section 4). 
 7
 We use different sets of control variables, X. Our baseline model includes only 
bank type dummies. In order to test the robustness of our results, we later also 
control for state ownership (STATE) and foreign ownership (FOREIGN), as 
well as whether the bank is listed or not (LIST). Furthermore, we later add 
several bank-specific variables, such as capital, and country-specific variables, 
such as regulatory quality, to our baseline model. We also control for profit 
smoothing. For a complete list and a description of the variables used in the 
regression analysis see Table 7. Summary statistics are presented in Table 8. 
3 Descriptive Statistics  
3.1 Ownership Concentration in the OECD Banking Sector 
Our dataset contains unlisted banks, savings and cooperative banks, as well as a 
number of specialised credit institutions. As this represents a deviation from the 
previous literature, we present detailed descriptive statistics for relationships 
among the main variables of interest. Table 3 presents summary statistics for the 
largest shareholding according to the type of bank. Table 3 indicates that the 
degree of ownership concentration varies across bank types. While ownership in 
bank holding companies and cooperative banks is usually more dispersed, 
ownership is highly concentrated in state banks and investment banks. There are 
also significant differences between listed and unlisted banks. As expected, 
ownership is more dispersed in case of listed credit institutions. However, 
overall ownership tends to be concentrated with the largest blockholder holding, 
on average, more than 50 percent of the shares. This is consistent with previous 
research that finds that banks are generally not widely held (Caprio et al., 2007).  
Table 4 indicates that ownership structures also differ across countries. As 
expected, bank ownership is more dispersed in the Anglo-Saxon countries (U.S., 
U.K.) compared to most other countries. La Porta et al. (1998) argue that 
differences in the degree of ownership concentration are caused by different 
levels of investor protection. If investor rights are better protected, shareholders 
have less need for a large block of shares to control management. Hence, 
ownership should be more dispersed in countries where shareholder rights are 
better protected and more concentrated in countries where investor rights are 
less protected. This is reflected in Table 4. With a T-test statistic of 6.8, 
ownership is significantly more concentrated in civil law than in common law 
countries (La Porta et al., 1998). At the same time, shareholder rights are 
significantly better protected in common law countries than in civil law 
countries (with a T-test statistic of 59.6).  
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 3.2 Bank Performance and Bank Risk-Taking 
We measure bank performance using return on equity (ROE). Given that we are 
interested in the effect of governance by shareholders on performance and risk, 
ROE comes closest to what may enter shareholders’ objective functions, given 
that we are limited to accounting data. Since we are interested in the long-run 
structural relationship between the performance and the ownership structure of 
banks, we use the average ROE in the pre-crisis period between 2000 and 2006 
to measure long-term performance. Summary statistics for the long-run 
performance are presented in Table 5. Table 5 indicates that investment banks 
and bank holding companies had the best and governmental credit institutions 
the worst average performance in the pre-crisis period. This may be evidence hat 
the managers of governmental credit institutions had more scope to extract 
private benefits than the managers of investment banks or bank holding 
companies, but it may also simply suggest that governmental institutions are 
poorly managed, as the government may not pursue profit maximizing 
objectives. Interestingly, savings banks (average ROE of 15 percent) do not 
necessarily show a lower average ROE compared to commercial banks (14 
percent) or bank holding companies (17 percent). 
To measure bank risk, we use the 2008 deviation 2008 from the long-term 
average ROE (DROE). Since risks have materialized during the crisis, we 
expect that banks that raised their profits between 2000 and 2006 through higher 
risk-taking should perform worse in 2008. The size of the 2008 deviation from 
the long-run can, therefore, be used as an indicator for bank risk-taking in the 
pre-crisis period. Summary statistics for DROE are presented in Table 6.10 Table 
6 shows that investment banks, bank holding companies and medium and long-
term credit banks suffered the largest and cooperative and mortgage banks the 
smallest losses in 2008 relative to long-run profitability. Investment banks, bank 
holding companies and medium and long-term credit banks appear to have taken 
greater risk in the pre-crisis period than cooperative and mortgage banks. To 
illustrate the relationship between bank performance and bank risk, we plot ROE 
against DROE. Figure 1 shows a significant (at the 1 percent level) and positive 
relationship between average performance and risk-taking. This suggests that the 
superior long-term performance of investment banks and bank holding 
companies may be attributed to greater risk-taking in the pre-crisis period.  
4 Baseline results 
We start with regressing ROE on STAKE and RIGHTS using OLS without any 
additional control variables. The results of this simple model are reported in the 
first column of Table 9. We find that STAKE and RIGHTS are both 
                                           
10  Recall that DROE is defined as [ ]RoERoE −− 20081 , and is increasing in the 2008 loss.  
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 significantly related to average ROE. The positive coefficient for STAKE and 
RIGHTS indicates that bank performance is higher if ownership is more 
concentrated and if banks are located in countries with a higher level of investor 
protection. To check whether the positive relationship is due to higher risk 
taking, we regress DROE on STAKE and RIGHTS. The results for DROE are 
reported in the second column of Table 9. Both STAKE and RIGHTS are highly 
significant. The positive coefficient for RIGHTS indicates that banks in 
countries with better shareholder protection incurred greater risks. In stark 
contrast to RIGHTS, we obtain a negative coefficient for STAKE, which is 
significant at the 1 percent level. Banks with more concentrated owners appear 
to incur fewer risks. 
The results are inconsistent if the ownership structure of a bank is endogenous 
and the outcome of a competitive selection process in which various advantages 
and disadvantages of different degrees of ownership concentration are balanced 
(Demsetz, 1983). For this reason, we instrument STAKE with a dummy variable 
indicating whether a bank is located in civil law or common law countries 
(COMMON). Since investor rights are better protected in common law 
countries, ownership should be more dispersed in common law than in civil law 
countries.11 Table 4 indicates that ownership concentration is indeed 
significantly higher in civil law than in common law countries. Since 
COMMON seems to capture differences in the ownership structure reasonably 
well and since it is largely determined by cultural and historical facts, we regard 
COMMON as a valid instrument for STAKE.12  
The results of the instrumental variables regression are reported in columns 3 
and 4 of Table 9. While the results for STAKE and RIGHTS remain unchanged 
in the performance equation (ROE), the sign of STAKE changes from negative 
to positive in the risk equation (DROE). The reason is simultaneity. If risk 
increases with ownership concentration because large shareholders are better 
able to affect risk taking, but ownership concentration decreases as risk 
increases – which is reasonable since large owners are less diversified than 
minority shareholders -, the coefficient for STAKE may become negative if we 
do not control for endogeneity. This is consistent with the literature. Caprio et al. 
(2007), for example, argue that investor protection alone may not provide a 
sufficiently powerful corporate governance mechanism to small shareholders. 
Put differently, even with strong investor protection laws, small shareholders 
may lack the means to monitor and govern banks. Since tests indicate that 
                                           
11  We obtain very similar results if we use the average ownership concentration of banks in a 
given country as an instrument as in Laeven and Levine (2009). The results are available 
from the authors upon request. 
12  Test statistics indicate that this is indeed the case. 
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 STAKE is indeed endogenous, we from now on only report results using 
instrumental variables regressions.  
The positive and significant coefficients for STAKE and RIGHTS in the 
instrumental variable regression indicate that shareholders push for greater risk-
taking and not managers. This is in line with recent findings by Fahlenbrach and 
Stulz (2009) and Beltratti and Stulz (2009). They show that stock price 
performance during the crisis was worse in those banks, in which the incentives 
of management were better aligned with the interests of shareholders.  
In the next step, we add bank type dummy variables. Gropp and Kashyap 
(2009), for example, show that due to differences in the market for corporate 
control (cooperative banks cannot be taken over), bank type may be an 
important determinant of performance (and possibly risk) over the medium term. 
The results are reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 9. We refer to this 
specification as our ‘baseline model’ below. STAKE and RIGHTS remain 
highly significant and keep their positive sign indicating that a higher level of 
ownership concentration and better investor protection increase bank 
performance and bank risk-taking. In addition, the HOLDING, SAVINGS and 
COOPERATIVE dummy indicate that the average performance of bank holding 
companies, savings banks and cooperative banks was significantly better, while 
the performance of state-banks (STATEBANK) was significantly worse 
compared to commercial banks (the omitted category). Bank holding companies 
and savings banks also show, on average, larger downward deviation from long 
run averages in 2008 as indicated by the significant and positive coefficient for 
HOLDING and SAVINGS in the risk equation.  
Using the baseline coefficients, we find that, evaluated at the sample mean, a 
one percent increase in ownership concentration, would result in 1.26 percent 
better average performance during 2000 to 2006 and 0.15 percent worse 
performance during 2008. A one percent increase in ownership rights, again 
evaluated at the mean, would result in a 0.74 percent better performance during 
2000 to 2006 and 0.12 percent larger loss in 2008 relative to average 
performance. An illustration may help to better understand the economic 
magnitudes. The coefficients suggest that a bank whose largest shareholder 
owns less than 10 percent and who is headquartered in a country with poor 
shareholder rights (RIGHTS equal to 2, e.g. Switzerland) is estimated to have an 
2000 to 2006 average ROE of 6.3 percent. In 2008, the ROE was 5 percentage 
points lower. In contrast, a bank headquartered in a country with strong 
shareholder rights (RIGHTS equal to 5, e.g. U.K.) and where the largest 
shareholder owns 75 percent of the shares would have an average 2000 to 2006 
ROE of 30.1 percent and the 2008 ROE would be 31 percentage points lower, 
i.e. a ROE of minus one percent. 
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 Overall, therefore, we find that owner controlled banks performed significantly 
better before the crisis and significantly worse during the crisis compared to 
manager controlled banks. The effects are economically large. Bank owners 
seem to have been the driving force behind the risks that banks incurred in the 
wake of the crisis, not the managers. This is consistent with standard agency 
theoretic arguments (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Holmstrom and Ricart I Costa, 
1986; and Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992). Risk-averse managers, faced with 
undiversifiable career and income risk, would like to incur fewer risks than 
desired by the owners of the bank. If agency conflicts between management and 
share holders are reduced when shareholder rights are stronger and/or ownership 
is more concentrated, the outcome is more risk taking. We also find that 
controlling for shareholder rights, large stakeholders prefer more risk than 
management. Large stakeholders seem to use their power to control 
management to increase risk taking. We find no evidence that their lack of 
diversification or their desire to protect private benefits is empirically important. 
In the following sections of the paper we extend and modify our model in order 
to check the robustness of the results. We add several bank-specific variables to 
examine whether our results are explained by other bank characteristics that 
happen to be correlated with the degree of shareholder control of management. 
Second, as suggested by Laeven and Levine (2009), we check whether the 
relationship between performance, risk, ownership concentration and 
shareholder rights depends on the level of banking regulation and supervision. 
Third, we test whether the results for STAKE and RIGHTS change if we control 
for other important institutional factors and if the results are robust to controlling 
for the structure of the banking market in the country where the bank is located. 
Since our measures for bank risk and performance measure may be influenced 
by profit smoothing, we additionally check whether our results are robust if we 
control for profit smoothing. Finally, we test whether the likelihood that a bank 
received financial support from the government during the crisis is higher if 
ownership is concentrated and investor rights better protected. 
5 Bank Characteristics 
First, we add a set of dummy variables indicating whether a bank is state-owned 
(STATE), foreign-owned (FOREIGN) or listed (LIST). The results are reported 
in the first two columns of Table 10. The dummy variables turn out to be highly 
significant. The results indicate that listed banks performed better in terms of 
ROE than banks that are not listed. This is consistent with the idea that better 
functioning markets for corporate control push managers towards better 
performance (Gropp and Kashyap, 2009). In contrast, banks owned by the state 
or by foreign shareholders perform significantly worse, consistent with the 
literature which usually finds that government (La Porta et al., 2002) and foreign 
ownership (De Young and Nolle, 1996 and Berger et al., 2000) reduces bank 
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 performance. Berger et al. (2000) explain the relative inefficiency of foreign 
banks by organizational diseconomies to operating and monitoring banks from 
distance. Government ownership reduces bank performance, since politicians 
acquire control of bank to provide employment, subsidies and other benefits to 
supporters who return the favor in the form of votes in the next election (La 
Porta et al., 2002).13 
The results for DROE suggest that listed banks increased their performance in 
the pre-crisis by greater risk-taking (significant at the 10 percent level). In 
contrast, controlling for ownership concentration and shareholder rights, banks 
owned by the government reported, on average, smaller losses in 2008.14 The 
basic result of the paper remains unchanged, however: STAKE and RIGHTS 
remain significant and retain their positive sign. 
Next, we add several bank accounting variables to our model. Consistent with 
the dependent variable in the performance regressions, they are averaged over 
the period 2000 to 2006. Since we do not regard them as strictly exogenous to 
bank performance and bank risk, we do not include them in our baseline model. 
The results are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 10.15 The first variable 
included is the logarithm of total bank assets to control for bank size (SIZE). 
SIZE turns out to be significant and positive in the regression with ROE 
indicating that larger banks performed better between 2000 and 2006 than 
smaller credit institutions. Larger banks may outperform smaller banks because 
of economies of scale and scope or greater market power (Berger et al., 2000). 
However, SIZE is also significant and positive in the risk equation. This 
suggests that at least part of the superior performance of large banks in the pre-
crisis period can also be attributed to greater risk-taking. Bank risk increases 
with SIZE, because large banks may be more likely to engage in more risky 
transactions on the international financial market owing to the large fixed costs 
necessary to operate globally (Chen and Mazumdar, 1997). They may also have 
                                           
13  Sapienza (2004), for example, finds that state-owned banks in Italy charge systematically 
lower interest rates in regions in which the political party affiliated with the bank is 
stronger. 
14  This finding is inconsistent with anecdotal evidence for Germany, where in particular the 
state-owned Landesbanken were affected by the crisis. Several of these banks had to be 
bailed out by the Government. We checked whether these banks are in the sample and they 
are. It turns out that their performance before the crisis was already quite poor, which 
implies that their losses relative to average performance (DROE) were not as large as for 
some private sector banks. Furthermore, some Landesbanken recorded their largest losses 
in 2009. BayernLB, for example, announced additional losses of 3.8 billion euro in 
December 2009. Since we focus on the losses in 2008, the losses in 2009 are not included. 
The results for the government ownership dummy should, hence, be interpreted with 
caution. 
15  Note that we lose a few observations due to missing values for the loans and deposits 
category (see also Table 8). 
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 incurred greater risks based on the expectation of a government bail-out in case 
things turn out poorly (Boyd and Runkle, 1993). 
The second bank characteristic included is the ratio of total equity to total assets 
(EQUITY). The effect of EQUITY on performance is not clear a priori. On the 
one hand, better capitalized banks should have lower refinancing costs owing to 
lower insolvency risk. This suggests that EQUITY is positively related to long-
term performance. However, a higher level of capital may also indicate that 
banks forego profitable investment opportunities. This should reduce 
performance. Our results suggest that neither of these effects dominates, since 
EQUITY is insignificant for ROE. While the effect on long-term performance is 
not clear a priori, better capitalized banks should have suffered smaller losses 
during the crisis, based on the idea that banks with larger charter values (more 
“skin in the game”) are hesitant to incur great risks (Keeley, 1990, Cordella and 
Yeyati, 2003). This implies that EQUITY should be negatively related to DROE 
in the risk equation. This is what we find. However, the effect of EQUITY is not 
statistically significant. This contrasts with Beltratti and Stulz (2009), who find a 
significant and positive link between EQUITY and performance during the 
crisis. However, when they restrict the sample to large banks they obtain an 
insignificant coefficient for EQUITY as we do. 
To control for the liability side of the bank, we include DEPOSITS defined as 
the ratio of total deposits to total bank assets. DEPOSITS is significantly (at the 
10 percent level) related to long-term performance. The positive coefficient 
indicates that banks with a larger deposit base have a higher long-term 
performance than banks that have a smaller deposit base. This is reasonable, 
since refinancing via deposits is cheaper than other sources of funding, 
expecially in light of deposit insurance. Some form of explicit deposit insurance 
existed in all countries of our sample (Barth et al., 2006). Since deposit funding 
usually also provides a more stable source of funding, in particular when money 
markets work poorly, we expect that banks with a larger deposit base should 
have also experienced smaller losses in 2008. The results do not support this 
hypothesis. DEPOSITS is insignificant for DROE and consistent with evidence 
in Beltratti and Stulz (2009). 
To control for the asset side of the bank, we include LOANS defined as the ratio 
of total loans to total assets. Banks where LOANS is higher should have a 
smaller portfolio of securities. We would expect such banks to have performed 
better during the crisis because their regulatory capital would have been less 
endangered by the increase in credit spreads that reduces securities values 
(Beltratti and Stulz, 2009). However, these banks would have also had to 
increase loan loss reserves on their loans. The results suggest that the second 
effect dominates, since performance dropped more in 2008 if banks had a larger 
loan portfolio as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient for LOANS 
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 in the risk equation. Greater lending activities also seem to have raised average 
performance in the pre-crisis period. More importantly, however, bank 
performance and risk are still positively and significantly (at the 1 percent level) 
related to the degree of ownership concentration and the level of investor 
protection. 
6 Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Next, we test whether our results are robust to the inclusion of bank regulatory 
variables. Caprio et al. (2007) and Laeven and Levine (2009) show that bank 
valuation and risk-taking depend on the level of banking regulation and 
supervision. Hence, we include RESTRICT, CAPITAL, OFFICIAL and 
INDEPENDENCE. RESTRICT is an index that measures to which extent the 
regulator can restrict the activities of banks, while CAPITAL measures 
regulatory oversight over bank capital. OFFICIAL and INDEPENDENCE 
control for the power and the independence of the supervisory authority. For a 
more detailed description of these variables see Table 7. The results with the 
banking regulation and supervision variables are reported in Table 11. We 
follow the literature (e.g. Caprio et al., 2007, Laeven and Levine, 2009) and add 
each variable separately to our baseline model. A priori, if regulation is effective 
in reducing risk taking by banks, bank losses in 2008 should be smaller in 
countries with tighter regulation and a more powerful and independent regulator. 
However, consistent with less risk taking, we would also expect that banks 
located in countries with better regulation and supervision performed worse in 
the pre-crisis period. This suggests that the regulatory variables are negatively 
related to ROE and DROE.  
Our results show the opposite. RESTRICT is positive and significant at the 1 
percent level in both regressions, while CAPITAL is positive and marginally 
significant at the 10 percent level. Limiting banks in their activities 
(RESTRICT) and the quality of capital requirements (CAPITAL) are positively 
related to bank performance and bank risk. This corresponds to recent empirical 
work by Caprio et al. (2007), Beltratti and Stulz (2009) and Laeven and Levine 
(2009). The latter argue that bank owners may seek to compensate for the utility 
loss from stricter activity restrictions by increasing risk on remaining activities, 
while stricter regulations on capital may have motivated banks to engage in off-
balance sheet activities to evade capital regulation. OFFICAL and 
INDEPENDENCE are not significantly related to bank performance and risk, 
consistent with Caprio et al. (2007).  
Finally, we add a variable that captures the level of deposit insurance coverage 
(COVERAGE). Deposit insurance may aggravate agency problems, since it 
lowers the incentive of depositors to monitor the bank, because their funds are 
protected regardless of the outcomes of the investment strategies the bank 
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 selects (Macey and O’Hara, 2003). This should increase the incentive of 
shareholders to engage in excessive risk-taking (Prowse, 1997; Macey and 
O’Hara, 2003). Alternatively, deposit insurance may reduce the incentives for 
risk taking as it increases the charter value of the bank (Keeley, 1990; Cordella 
and Yeyati, 2003). Unfairly priced deposit insurance constitutes an implicit 
government subsidy to the bank, increasing profits and the incentives to remain 
in business and, therefore, may reduce risk taking. Our results are consistent 
with the second idea. While COVERAGE is insignificant in the performance 
equation, it is negative and significantly related to bank risk in the risk equation.  
Overall, as in all other regression that include banking regulation and 
supervision variables STAKE and RIGHTS remain significant and positively 
related to bank performance and risk-taking consistent with the hypothesis that 
shareholders and not managers push for greater risk-taking. 
7 Other Country Characteristics 
Finally, to test whether our shareholder rights variables proxies for some other 
country variables, we follow Beltratti and Stulz (2009) and Caprio et al. (2007) 
and include variables that control for the overall institutional environment. The 
first index measures to what extent agents in a country have confidence in 
contract enforcement and property rights (RULE OF LAW), while the overall 
quality of the regulatory environment is proxied by REGULATORY 
QUALITY. Furthermore, we include an index on the level of corruption 
(CORRUPTION). Since these indices are correlated, we add each index 
separately to our baseline model. The results are reported in columns 1 to 6 of 
Table 12. The institutional variables turn out to be mostly insignificant. In 
contrast, STAKE and RIGHTS remain significant and positively correlated with 
ROE and DROE.  
To control for the structure of the banking system, we use DBAGDP and C3. 
DBAGDP measures the size of the banking system and is defined as the ratio of 
total deposit money bank assets to GDP. C3 proxies for the degree of banking 
market concentration by the sum of the market share of the three largest banks. 
The results are reported in columns 7 and 8 of Table 12. They suggest that 
average long-term performance is higher in countries with a smaller banking 
system and a higher degree of banking market concentration. Bank risk, in 
contrast, does not seem to be higher in countries with a larger banking sector, 
but is lower in countries with a higher degree of banking market concentration. 
The latter may indicate that banks that operate in more concentrated markets 
may have fewer incentives to engage in more risky activities to increase their 
profits owing to a lower level of product market competition. This is consistent 
with the idea that bank charter values reduce risk taking (Keeley, 1990). 
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 However, even controlling for the banking sector characteristics does not change 
our results for STAKE and RIGHTS.  
Since the financial crisis started in the United States and may have hit U.S. 
banks hardest, we were concerned that the large number of US banks in our 
sample – almost one third of all banks in our sample are located in the US – 
could drive our results. For this reason, we check whether our results are robust 
to the inclusion of a dummy variable for the United States. The results are 
indeed weaker, but both STAKE and RIGHTS retain their positive relationship 
with performance before the crisis and losses during the crisis. The effect is 
significant at the 10 percent level. Furthermore, although we think that ROE 
comes closest to what may enter shareholders’ objective functions, we replace 
ROE by the return-on-assets (ROA) to see whether our results are robust to the 
choice of the dependent variable. The results are the same: STAKE and 
RIGHTS remain positive and significant indicating that shareholders and not 
managers push for greater risk-taking to increase long-term performance. Both 
results are not reported for the sake of brevity.   
8 Profit smoothing and bail-outs 
A fundamental concern is that our risk and performance measure may be 
influenced by profit smoothing incentives of managers. Managers may have the 
incentive to smooth profits to mask true firm performance and risk-taking and to 
conceal their private benefits from shareholders (Leuz et al., 2003). They can do 
so by using their accounting discretion to create reserves for future periods by 
understating earnings in years of good performance and by reporting higher 
profits in years with bad performance. Leuz et al. (2003) show that accounting 
discretion is particularly large in firms with a dispersed ownership structure and 
weak shareholder rights. This suggests that our results for bank performance 
may not driven by the incentive of managers to reduce risk, but by greater 
discretion of managers to smooth profits over time.  
To control for profit smoothing, we follow John et al. (2008) and include one 
minus the ratio of the bank-level standard deviation of operating income divided 
by the bank-level standard deviation of cash flow operations (SMOOTHING) 
between 2000 and 2006. The cash flow from operations is measured indirectly 
by subtracting accruals from operating income. Following Healy (1985), Jones 
(1991), Leuz et al. (2003) and John et al. (2008), we calculate accruals as 
follows: (∆total current assets - ∆cash) - (∆total current liabilities - ∆short-term 
debt - ∆taxes payable) - depreciation and amortization expenses. The latter is 
assumed to be zero in case of banks, while short-term debt is proxied by 
deposits and short-term funding. If a bank does not report information on any of 
these variables, we follow Leuz et al. (2003) and assume that the change in this 
variable is zero. If managers smooth profits over time the standard deviation 
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 operating income should be smaller than the standard deviation of cash-flows. 
Hence, a higher value for SMOOTHING indicates a higher level of earnings 
smoothing. Summary statistics for SMOOTHING are presented in Table 8.  
A priori, we would expect the impact of earnings smoothing on iRoE  be small, 
because iRoE  represents average performance over an extended period. The 
main focus is therefore on the risk equation with DROE as the dependent 
variable. Profit smoothing may explain at least part of the smaller drop in 
earnings in 2008 for banks with weak governance (Leuz et al., 2003). The 
results for the baseline model including SMOOTHING are reported in columns 
1 and 2 of Table 13. Like John et al. (2008), we obtain a negative and significant 
coefficient for SMOOTHING in the profit equation, even though we use 
averages over 2000 to 2006. This indicates that even average performance is 
lower if managers smooth profits over time. Somewhat surprisingly, 
SMOOTHING is insignificant in the risk equation and the coefficients for 
STAKE and RIGHTS remain significant and positive. This suggests that our 
results are not driven by profit smoothing. 
Our results indicate that owner-controlled banks incurred greater risks and had 
to report larger losses in 2008 than banks that are controlled by their managers. 
As a consequence, owner-controlled banks may be more likely to need financial 
support from the government during the crisis than manager-controlled banks. 
To test this hypothesis, we run an instrumental variables probit regression. The 
dependent variable takes a value of one if a bank has received any kind of 
financial support from the government during the crisis and zero otherwise 
(GOVAID). The results for the baseline model are reported in column 3 of Table 
13. The results are consistent with our hypothesis. STAKE and RIGHTS are 
significant and positively related with the probability that a bank has received 
government aid. This indicates that owner-controlled banks took greater risk in 
the pre-crisis period and, thus, needed greater financial support from the 
government than manager-controlled banks once the crisis started to unfold and 
the incurred risks to materialize.16 The probit regression, hence, provides further 
evidence that banks that are controlled by their owners took greater risk than 
manager-controlled banks. 
                                           
16  We made no attempt to control for the additional equity received in 2008 from the 
government in the DROE regressions. Most banks reported losses in 2008 and therefore 
not removing the government equity share understates the effect of STAKE and RIGHTS 
on DROE.   
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 9 Conclusions 
 The results in this paper suggest that owner controlled banks experienced higher 
profits before the crisis and larger losses during the crisis. Both imply that owner 
controlled banks incurred greater risks compared to manager controlled banks. 
Economically these effects are large. The profits of banks owned by a majority 
shareholder operating in a country with strong shareholder rights declined about 
five times as much during the recent crisis compared to widely held banks 
operating in countries with weak shareholder rights. These effects are robust to 
including a wide variety of regulatory, bank specific and country specific 
variables. We also find that the probability of owner controlled banks to receive 
government assistance during the crisis is significantly higher than that of 
manager controlled banks. 
We obtain the results using a large dataset of OECD banks, for which we 
collected information on ownership concentration. In total, the sample consists 
of more than 1,100 banks for 25 OECD countries. In particular, in addition to 
most listed banks, the sample also includes many unlisted credit institutions. We 
think this is important for the broader applicability of the results, since unlisted 
banks represent the majority of banks in most countries around the world. The 
greater variability in ownership and corporate governance structures assists us in 
identifying the effects of governance on bank risk taking. 
The results contradict the popular sentiment that managers took advantage of 
insufficient control by shareholders to obtain compensation packages that 
disproportionately reward short-term risk taking (e.g. OECD, 2009). They do 
not support the idea that aligning the interests of management better with 
shareholders will reduce risk taking of banks. Instead they suggest the opposite. 
If management is better controlled by shareholders, banks may increase their 
risk taking. Indeed, one may be able to interpret the observed compensation 
schemes before the crisis as attempts by shareholders to induce management to 
increase their risk taking in line with the preferences of shareholders. At the 
same time, weakening the control of shareholders over management would not 
only reduce risk, but may entail significant efficiency costs for banks. Privately 
optimal management compensation schemes may not be socially optimal, as 
they do not take the externality of a higher probability of bank failure into 
account. 
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 Table 1: Bank Sample 
The sample includes 1142 banks from 25 OECD countries. Bank data comes from the Bankscope 
database of Bureau van Dijk. We focus on large banks having at least $1 billion in total assets in the 
last available year. Banks for which we do not have at least three observations for the period between 
2000 and 2006 are not included. 
  Number of Banks 
of which 
listed of which unlisted 
Australia 13 6 7 
Austria 50 8 42 
Belgium 14 3 11 
Canada 25 11 14 
Denmark 28 19 9 
Finland  3 1 2 
France 126 19 107 
Germany 95 14 81 
Greece 10 9 1 
Ireland 12 2 10 
Italy 99 26 73 
Japan 103 88 15 
Korea, Rep. 14 9 5 
Mexico 17 3 14 
Netherlands 21 4 17 
New Zealand 6 0 6 
Norway 13 10 3 
Portugal 10 5 5 
Spain 25 10 15 
Sweden 16 3 13 
Switzerland 59 21 38 
Turkey 13 10 3 
United Kingdom 53 14 39 
United States 317 180 137 
Total 1,142 475 667 
 
Table 2: Banks by Specialization 
  
Number of 
Banks 
of which 
listed of which unlisted 
Bank Holding & Holding Company 233 202 31 
Commercial Bank 526 185 341 
Cooperative Bank 92 23 69 
Investment Bank/Securities House 68 20 48 
Medium & Long Term Credit Bank 18 6 12 
Multi-Lateral Governmental Bank 1 0 1 
Real Estate/Mortgage Bank 60 13 47 
Savings Bank 95 13 82 
Specialised Governmental Credit Institution 49 13 36 
Total 1,142 475 667 
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 Table 3: Ownership Concentration by Specialization 
Table 3 presents summary statistics on the degree of ownership concentration for different types of 
banks. Ownership concentration is measured by the largest direct or indirect ownership stake. Every 
direct and indirect shareholding below 10 percent is set to zero. Ownership information comes from 
the Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk. Means equality tests for listed versus unlisted banks 
reported at the bottom of the table. ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1-/5-/10-% level. 
  Obs. Mean Median Max. Min Std.Dev. 
Bank Holding & Holding Company 233 17.94 0.00 100.00 0.00 30.54 
Commercial Bank 526 57.80 50.10 100.00 0.00 38.61 
Cooperative Bank 92 32.95 25.00 100.00 0.00 33.18 
Investment Bank/Securities House 68 67.09 100.00 100.00 0.00 40.89 
Medium & Long Term Credit Bank 18 62.99 65.00 100.00 0.00 36.50 
Multi-Lateral Governmental Bank 1 60.11 60.11 60.11 60.11 0.00 
Real Estate/Mortgage Bank 60 58.99 61.65 100.00 0.00 37.64 
Savings Bank 95 53.99 50.10 100.00 0.00 32.96 
Specialised Governmental Credit 
Institution 49 76.87 85.00 100.00 22.50 24.60 
Total 1,142 48.87 50.10 100.00 0.00 39.83 
  - Listed Banks 475 18.19 0.00 100.00 0.00 26.86 
  - Unlisted Banks 667 70.17 85.00 100.00 0.00 32.49 
T-test statistic on the sample mean: Listed Banks vs. Unlisted Banks: 29.8151***. 
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 Table 4: Ownership Concentration and Shareholder Rights by Country 
Table 4 presents summary statistics on the degree of ownership concentration and investor protection 
for different countries. Ownership concentration is measured by the largest direct or indirect 
ownership stake. Every direct and indirect shareholding below 10 percent is set to zero. Ownership 
information comes from Bankscope. Investor protection is measured by the anti-director rights index 
(La Porta et al., 1998). Means equality tests for common law and civil law countries are reported at the 
bottom of the table. ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1-/5-/10-% level. Common law countries are 
Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. All other 
countries are civil law countries. 
  Obs. Mean Median Max. Min. Std.Dev. RIGHTS 
Australia 13 42.76 99.77 100.00 11.44 35.58 4 
Austria 50 68.96 73.94 100.00 0.00 27.40 2 
Belgium 14 73.38 99.77 100.00 11.44 35.58 0 
Canada 25 43.73 50.10 100.00 0.00 41.38 5 
Denmark 28 26.59 0.00 100.00 0.00 36.44 2 
Finland  3 59.12 56.90 100.00 20.48 39.80 3 
France 126 61.17 56.46 100.00 0.00 34.51 3 
Germany 95 78.44 92.50 100.00 0.00 27.89 1 
Greece 10 54.49 47.17 100.00 0.00 31.34 2 
Ireland 12 83.33 100.00 100.00 0.00 38.92 4 
Italy 99 49.90 51.03 100.00 0.00 36.77 1 
Japan 103 15.76 0.00 100.00 0.00 31.03 4 
Korea, Rep. 14 54.30 61.25 100.00 0.00 38.13 2 
Mexico 17 75.43 99.97 100.00 0.00 35.28 1 
Netherlands 21 77.43 100.00 100.00 0.00 32.04 2 
New Zealand 6 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 4 
Norway 13 2.61 0.00 34.00 0.00 9.42 4 
Portugal 10 64.72 86.20 100.00 0.00 42.76 3 
Spain 25 35.02 14.98 100.00 0.00 37.19 4 
Sweden 16 70.60 100.00 100.00 0.00 40.30 3 
Switzerland 59 73.77 88.10 100.00 0.00 32.77 2 
Turkey 13 72.38 76.99 100.00 30.15 22.49 2 
United Kingdom 53 72.29 100.00 100.00 0.00 41.68 5 
United States 317 29.00 13.65 100.00 0.00 32.20 5 
Total 1,142 48.87 50.10 100.00 0.00 39.83 3.26 
  - of which common 
law countries 426 38.72 49.00 100.00 0.00 38.67 4.92 
  - of which civil law 
countries 716 54.91 53.65 100.00 0.00 39.31 2.27 
T-test statistic on the sample mean: Common law countries vs. civil law countries: 6.7981***  
        
We additionally test whether anti-director rights (RIGHTS) significantly differ for common law and civil law 
countries. 
  Obs. Mean Median Max. Min Std.Dev.  
  - of which common 
law countries 426 4.92 5 5 4 0.26  
  - of which civil law 
countries 716 2.27 2 4 0 1.14  
T-test statistic on the sample mean: Common law countries vs. civil law countries: -59.60 ***  
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for Bank Performance ( iRoE ) 
Table 5 presents summary statistics for bank performance. Data on bank perforrmance comes from the 
Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk. Bank performance is measured by the average return-on-
equity (ROE) in period between 2000 and 2006. Banks for which we do not have at least three 
observations are not included. ROE is winsorized at the 1-and 99-% level.  
  Obs. Mean Median Max.  Min. Std.Dev. 
Bank Holding & Holding Company 233 0.17 0.17 0.46 -0.16 0.08 
Commercial Bank 526 0.14 0.14 0.46 -0.16 0.11 
Cooperative Bank 92 0.12 0.11 0.46 0.02 0.05 
Investment Bank/Securities House 68 0.20 0.19 0.46 -0.02 0.14 
Medium & Long Term Credit Bank 18 0.11 0.10 0.27 0.04 0.06 
Multi-lateral Governmental Bank 1 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 
Real Estate/Mortgage Bank 60 0.12 0.11 0.34 -0.16 0.08 
Savings Bank 95 0.15 0.14 0.46 0.03 0.07 
Specialised Governmental Credit 
Institution 49 0.10 0.10 0.46 -0.13 0.10 
Total 1,142 0.14 0.14 0.46 -0.16 0.10 
 
Table 6: Summary Statistics for Bank Risk (DROE) 
Table 6 presents summary statistics for bank risk. Data on bank risk comes from the Bankscope 
database of Bureau van Dijk. Bank risk is measured by is measured by the deviation in ROE in 2008 
from its average performance in the period between 2000 and 2006. Banks for which we do not have 
at least three observations are not included. DROE is defined as [ ]RoERoE −− 20081 . A larger value for 
DROE, hence, indicates greater losses in 2008. To eliminate outliers, DROE is winsorized at the 1-and 
99-% level.  
  Obs. Mean Median Max.  Min. Std.Dev. 
Bank Holding & Holding Company 233 1.19 1.11 2.50 0.41 0.28 
Commercial Bank 526 1.11 1.05 2.50 0.41 0.28 
Cooperative Bank 92 1.06 1.04 1.37 0.96 0.08 
Investment Bank/Securities House 68 1.17 1.06 2.50 0.41 0.37 
Medium & Long Term Credit Bank 18 1.19 1.13 1.19 0.41 0.37 
Multi-lateral Governmental Bank 1 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.00 
Real Estate/Mortgage Bank 60 1.05 1.04 2.31 0.41 0.26 
Savings Bank 95 1.16 1.08 2.50 0.70 0.27 
Specialised Governmental Credit 
Institution 49 1.09 1.03 2.42 0.41 0.27 
Total 1,142 1.13 1.06 2.50 0.41 0.28 
 
 Table 7: Description of Variables 
Variable Description 
iRoE  Average return-on-equity over the period between 2000 and 2006 for bank i. To eliminate outliers, ROE is winsorized at the 1- and 99-percent level. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
DROE DROE is defined as [ ]RoERoE −− 20081 . A larger value for DROE, hence, indicates greater losses in 2008 and thus greater risk-taking in the period 
between 2000 and 2006. To eliminate outliers, DROE is winsorized at the 1- and 99-percent level.  Source: Bankscope (2009) 
STAKE The largest direct or indirect stake that an individual shareholder or an affiliated group of shareholders has. A direct stake involves shares registered in 
the shareholder’s name, while indirect ownership involves bank shares that are held by entities that are controlled by the ultimate shareholder. Every 
direct and indirect ownership stake below 10 percent is set to 0 Source: Bankscope (2008) 
RIGHTS Index of anti-director rights for the country. Formed by adding one when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote, (2) shareholders 
are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on 
the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a 
shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median), or (6) when shareholders have 
preemptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholders meeting. The range for the index is from zero to six. Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
SAVINGS Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is classified as savings bank. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
COOPERATIVE Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is classified as cooperative bank. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
HOLDING Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is classified as bank holding company bank. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
INVESTMENT Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is classified as investment bank or a securities house. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
MORTGAGE Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is classified as real-estate or mortgage bank. Source: Bankscope (2009) 
STATEBANK Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is classified as a multi-lateral governmental bank, specialized governmental credit institution or medium- 
and long-term credit bank. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
FOREIGN Dummy variable indicating whether the largest shareholder is a foreign entity or individual. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
STATE  Dummy variable indicating whether the state or any other governmental institution is the largest shareholder. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
LIST Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is listed on a stock exchange. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
SMOOTHING SMOOTHING measures whether bank managers have smoothed profits over time. It is defined as one minus the ratio of the bank-level standard 
deviation of operating income divided by the bank-level standard deviation of cash flow operations between 2000 and 2006. A larger value for 
SMOOTHING indicates greater profit smoothing. The cash flow from operations is measured indirectly by subtracting accruals from operating income. 
Following Healy (1985), Jones (1991), Leuz et al. (2003) and John et al. (2008), we calculate accruals as follows: (∆total current assets - ∆cash) - 
(∆total current liabilities - ∆short-term debt - ∆taxes payable) - depreciation and amortization expenses. Depreciation and amortization expenses is 
assumed to be zero in case of banks. Short-term debt is proxied by deposits and short-term funding. To eliminate outliers, SMOOTHING is winsorized 
at the 1- and 99-percent level. Bank data is from Bankscope (2008). 
GOVAID Dummy variable indicating whether a bank received any kind of financial support from the government during the crisis. Source: Petrovic and Tusch 
(2009), Sinn (2009) and Office of Financial Stability (2010). For countries where we did not find any information on government rescue programs for 
the financial sector, we randomly checked on the internet whether banks received any kind of financial support form the government during the crisis.  
SIZE Average of the logarithm of total bank assets ($ Million) in the period between 2000 and 2006. To eliminate outliers, SIZE is winsorized at the 1- and 
99-percent level. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
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EQUITY Average ratio of total equity to total bank assets in the period between 2000 and 2006. To eliminate outliers, EQUITY is winsorized at the 1- and 99-
percent level. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
DEPOSITS Average ratio of total deposits to total bank assets in the period between 2000 and 2006. To eliminate outliers, DEPOSITS is winsorized at the 1- and 
99-percent level. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
SDPROFIT Standard deviation of net operating profits in the period between 2000 and 2006. To eliminate outliers, SDPROFIT is winsorized at the 1- and 99-
percent level. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
LOANS Average ratio of total loans to total bank assets in the period between 2000 and 2006. To eliminate outliers, LOANS is winsorized at the 1- and 99-
percent level. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
RESTRICT Index of regulatory restrictions on banks ability to engage in securities market activities, the insurance business and conduct real estate activities. The 
index ranges from 4 to 12 with higher values indicating more restrictions. Data are for 2003. Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006). 
CAPITAL Capital regulatory index. The index that includes information on the following questions. 1. Is the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement risk 
weighted in line with the Basel guidelines? 2. Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk? 3. Are market value of loan losses not realized 
in accounting books deducted from capital? 4. Are unrealized losses in securities portfolios deducted? 5. Are unrealized foreign exchange losses 
deducted? 6. What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital? 7. Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the 
regulatory/supervisory authorities? 8. Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other than cash or government 
securities? 9. Can initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds? The index ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values indicating greater 
stringency. Data are for 2003. Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006). 
OFFICIAL Index of official supervisory power. Adds one for an affirmative response to each for the following 14 questions: 1.Does the supervisory agency have 
the right to meet with external auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank? 2.Are auditors required by law to communicate directly 
to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in elicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 3.Can supervisors 
take legal action against external auditors for negligence? 4.Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organizational structure? 
5.Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? 6. Can the supervisory agency order the bank's directors or management to constitute provisions 
to cover actual or potential losses? 7. Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors' decision to distribute: a) Dividends? b) Bonuses? c) 
Management fees? 8.Can the supervisory agency legally declare-such that this declaration supersedes the rights of bank shareholders-that a bank is 
insolvent? 9.Does the Banking Law give authority to the supervisory agency to intervene that is, suspend some or all ownership rights-a problem bank? 
10.Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government agency do the following: a) Supersede 
shareholder rights? b) Remove and replace management? c) Remove and replace directors? shareholder rights? b) Remove and replace management? c) 
Remove and replace directors? The index ranges from 0 to 14 with higher values indicating greater power of the supervisory authority. Data are for 
2003. Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006). 
INDEPENDENCE The degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from the government and legally protected from the banking system. The index ranges 
from 0 to 2 with higher values indicating greater independence of the supervisory authority. Data are for 2003. Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2006). 
COVERAGE Ratio of deposit insurance coverage to per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2003. Source: Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2005) 
RULE OF LAW The average value the Rule of Law Index in the period between 2000 and 2006. Source: Kaufman et al. (2008) 
REGULATORY 
QUALITY 
The average value the Regulatory Quality in the period between 2000 and 2006. Source: Kaufman et al. (2008) 
CORRUPTION The average value the Freedom of Corruption Index in the period between 2000 and 2006. Source: Kaufman et al. (2008) 
DBAGDP Ratio of deposit-money bank assets to GDP. Source: World Bank (2009) 
C3 Market share of the three largest credit institutions. Source: World Bank (2009) 
 Table 8: Summary Statistics  
Table 8 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis. For a complete 
list and a description of the variables see Table 7.  
Variable Obs. Mean Median Max. Min. Std.Dev. 
ROE 1142 0.14 0.14 0.46 -0.16 0.10 
DROE 1142 1.13 1.06 2.50 0.41 0.28 
STAKE 1142 48.87 50.10 100.00 0.00 39.84 
RIGHTS 1142 3.27 3.00 5.00 0.00 1.58 
HOLDING  1142 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 
SAVINGS 1142 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.28 
COOPERATIVE  1142 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.27 
INVESTMENT 1142 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.24 
MORTGAGE 1142 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.22 
STATEBANK 1142 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.24 
LIST 1142 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.49 
FOREIGN 1142 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 
STATE   1142 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.21 
SMOOTHING 1100 0.89 0.94 0.99 -0.31 0.16 
SIZE 1142 8.79 8.62 13.57 5.92 1.71 
CAPITAL 1142 8.79 7.48 52.18 1.02 7.23 
DEPOSITS 1079 0.55 0.61 0.93 0.00 0.26 
LOANS 1123 0.60 0.66 0.98 0.01 0.23 
SDPROFIT 1101 120.31 17.36 2244.96 0.49 332.42 
RESTRICT 1142 8.80 10.00 12.00 4.00 2.21 
CAPITAL 1070 5.92 6.00 10.00 3.00 1.52 
OFFICIAL 1125 10.66 12.00 14.00 5.00 2.59 
INDEPENDENCE 1142 0.83 1.00 2.00 0.00 0.58 
RLAW 1142 1.44 1.55 1.93 -0.39 0.42 
REGQUAL 1142 1.35 1.54 1.84 0.14 0.34 
CORR 1142 1.53 1.65 2.41 -0.29 0.53 
 30
 Table 9: Baseline Results 
Table 9 presents the regression results for bank performance ( iRoE ) and bank risk (DROE). Data on 
bank performance and bank risk comes from the Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk. DROE is 
defined as [ ]RoERoE −− 20081 . A larger value for DROE indicates greater losses in 2008. Regressions use 
OLS (Model 1) and Two-Stage Least Squares (Model 2 and 3). We test for endogeneity using 
STATA’s endog option. The null hypothesis is that the endogenous variable can be treated as 
exogenous. The test-statistic is reported at the bottom of Table 9. To control for heteroscedasticity, we 
use White-robust standard errors (White, 1980). The sample includes 1142 banks. For a complete list 
and a description of the variables used in the regression analysis see Tables 7 and 8.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
                       Baseline 
  ROE DROE ROE DROE ROE DROE 
       
STAKE 0.000195** -0.000615*** 0.00523*** 0.00595*** 0.00362*** 0.00348*** 
 (2.34) (-2.76) (4.49) (3.00) (5.63) (2.82) 
       
RIGHTS 0.0136*** 0.0216*** 0.0568*** 0.0778*** 0.0310*** 0.0428*** 
 (6.88) (3.69) (5.21) (4.08) (5.89) (3.84) 
       
HOLDING     0.135*** 0.162*** 
     (5.70) (3.55) 
       
SAVINGS     0.0381** 0.0719** 
     (2.48) (2.14) 
       
COOPERATIV     0.0938*** 0.0592 
     (3.80) (1.44) 
       
INVESTMENT     0.0116 0.00591 
     (0.46) (0.11) 
       
MORTGAGE     0.00356 -0.0309 
     (0.17) (-0.75) 
       
STATE-BANK     -0.0583*** -0.00258 
     (-3.30) (-0.06) 
       
Observations 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 
F-test of   24.20*** 24.20*** 48.18*** 48.18*** 
Endogeneity     66.77*** 20.97*** 58.34*** 14.83*** 
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1-/5-/10-% level. 
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Table 10: Bank Characteristics 
Table 10 presents the results of robustness checks controlling for bank characteristics. Data on bank 
performance ( iRoE ) and bank risk (DROE) comes from the Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk.  
DROE is defined as [ ]RoERoE −− 20081 . A larger value for DROE, hence, indicates greater losses in 
2008. Since tests indicate that STAKE is endogenous, we only report the results of Two-Stage Least 
Squares regressions. We test for endogeneity using STATA’s endog option. The null hypothesis is that 
the endogenous variable can be treated as exogenous. The test-statistic is reported at the bottom of 
Table 10. To control for heteroscedasticity, we use White-robust standard errors (White, 1980). The 
sample includes 1142 banks. Since data on the bank characteristics is not available for the full 
samples, the number of observations in the regression including the bank variables is smaller than in 
the baseline model. For a complete list and a description of the variables used in the regression 
analysis see Tables 7 and 8.  
 Model 4 Model 5 
 State and Foreign Ownership Bank Characteristics 
 ROE DROE ROE DROE 
   
STAKE 0.0127** 0.0154* 0.00437*** 0.00458***
 (2.15) (1.79) (4.99) (2.93) 
   
RIGHTS 0.0721** 0.0971** 0.0294*** 0.0442***
 (2.46) (2.22) (5.47) (4.23) 
   
HOLDING 0.147*** 0.172** 0.166*** 0.209*** 
 (2.59) (2.08) (5.22) (3.67) 
   
SAVINGS 0.203** 0.301** 0.0365** 0.0719** 
 (2.01) (2.01) (2.04) (2.03) 
   
COOPERATIVE 0.392** 0.460 0.110*** 0.0708 
 (1.96) (1.58) (3.51) (1.42) 
   
INVESTMENT -0.0468 -0.0767 0.0339 0.0459 
 (-0.66) (-0.75) (1.01) (0.73) 
   
MORTGAGE 0.0993 0.106 -0.0298 -0.0427 
 (1.22) (0.91) (-1.12) (-0.88) 
   
STATE-BANK -0.00767 0.125 -0.0698*** -0.0186 
 (-0.12) (1.28) (-3.10) (-0.38) 
   
LIST 0.583** 0.778*  
 (2.00) (1.82)  
   
STATE -0.211* -0.380**  
 (-1.74) (-2.26)  
   
FOREIGN -0.0750** -0.0672  
 (-2.27) (-1.39)  
   
SIZE  0.0102** 0.0234***
  (2.21) (2.63) 
   
CAPITAL  -0.000750 -0.00181 
  (-0.63) (-0.97) 
   
DEPOSITS  0.0629* 0.0334 
  (1.89) (0.54) 
   
LOANS  0.102*** 0.188*** 
  (2.97) (2.96) 
   
Observations 1,142 1,142 1,073 1,073 
F-test of excluded instruments 5.04** 5.04** 33.48*** 33.48*** 
Endogeneity test-statistic 51.22*** 13.07*** 66.28*** 17.13*** 
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1-/5-/10-% level. 
 Table 11: Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Table 11 presents the results of robustness checks controlling for the level of banking regulation and supervision. Data on bank performance ( iRoE ) and bank 
risk (DROE) comes from the Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk. DROE is defined as [ ]RoERoE −− 20081 . A larger value for DROE, hence, indicates greater 
losses in 2008. Since tests indicate that STAKE is endogenous, we only report the results of Two-Stage Least Squares regressions. We test for endogeneity using 
STATA’s endog option. The null hypothesis is that the endogenous variable can be treated as exogenous. The test-statistic is reported at the bottom of Table 11. 
To control for heteroscedasticity, we use White-robust standard errors (White, 1980). The sample includes 1142 banks. Since data on banking regulation and 
supervision is not available for all countries, the number of observations in the regressions including the banking regulation and supervision is smaller than in the 
baseline model. For a complete list and a description of the variables used in the regression analysis see Tables 7 and 8.  
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
 Activity Restrictions Capital Regulation Power of the Supervisor Independence of the Supervisor Deposit Insurance 
  ROE DROE ROE DROE ROE DROE ROE DROE ROE DROE 
STAKE 0.00316*** 0.00261*** 0.00435*** 0.00378*** 0.00370*** 0.00346*** 0.00404*** 0.00368*** 0.00346*** 0.00394*** 
 (6.25) (2.67) (5.27) (2.59) (5.73) (2.85) (5.66) (2.82) (5.48) (2.98) 
RIGHTS 0.0241*** 0.0297*** 0.0338*** 0.0432*** 0.0323*** 0.0361*** 0.0370*** 0.0456*** 0.0291*** 0.0441*** 
 (6.12) (3.35) (5.41) (3.64) (6.13) (3.35) (6.23) (3.79) (5.62) (3.73) 
HOLDING 0.103*** 0.102*** 0.159*** 0.173*** 0.139*** 0.159*** 0.152*** 0.169*** 0.131*** 0.174*** 
 (5.90) (2.92) (5.38) (3.32) (5.86) (3.53) (5.74) (3.53) (5.68) (3.65) 
SAVINGS 0.0333** 0.0628** 0.0185 0.0574 0.0374** 0.0680** 0.0405** 0.0730** 0.0365** 0.0683** 
 (2.34) (1.99) (1.06) (1.61) (2.42) (2.01) (2.51) (2.15) (2.44) (1.98) 
COOPERATIVE 0.103*** 0.0767* 0.119*** 0.0728 0.0913*** 0.0661 0.0836*** 0.0545 0.0883*** 0.0656 
 (4.48) (1.94) (3.77) (1.51) (3.52) (1.55) (3.14) (1.31) (3.71) (1.52) 
INVESTMENT 0.0373* 0.0547 0.00956 0.0101 0.00969 0.00438 0.0156 0.00775 0.0108 -0.00674 
 (1.71) (1.11) (0.31) (0.17) (0.38) (0.08) (0.59) (0.14) (0.43) (-0.12) 
MORTGAGE 0.0152 -0.00876 -0.0136 -0.0518 -0.00101 -0.0427 0.0134 -0.0264 -0.00926 -0.0418 
 (0.79) (-0.21) (-0.55) (-1.21) (-0.05) (-1.04) (0.57) (-0.63) (-0.45) (-0.95) 
STATE-BANK -0.0488*** 0.0155 -0.0465* 0.0557 -0.0563*** -0.0166 -0.0412** 0.00530 -0.0575*** -0.0114 
 (-3.03) (0.38) (-1.90) (0.91) (-2.95) (-0.35) (-2.15) (0.12) (-3.33) (-0.25) 
RESTRICT 0.0148*** 0.0281***  
 (4.28) (4.11)  
CAPITAL  0.00692* 0.00999  
  (1.80) (1.59)  
OFFICIAL  -0.00171 0.00571
  (-0.77) (1.29)
INDEPENDENCE   -0.0388*** -0.0178
   (-3.72) (-0.92)
COVERAGE   -0.0000547 -0.000221** 
   (-0.86) (-1.97) 
Observations 1,142 1,142 1,070 1,070 1,125 1,125 1,142 1,142 1,123 1,123 
F-test of excluded 80.21*** 80.21*** 35.50*** 32.50*** 50.00*** 50.00*** 44.51*** 44.51*** 48.73*** 48.73*** 
Endogeneity test- 60.85*** 11.40*** 62.36*** 12.89*** 65.34*** 15.08*** 66.62*** 15.08*** 51.99*** 16.73*** 
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1-/5-/10-% level. 
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 Table 12: Other Country Characteristics  
Table 12 presents the results of robustness checks controlling other country characteristics. Data on bank performance (ROE) and bank risk ( iRoE ) comes from 
the Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk. DROE is defined as [ ]RoERoE −− 20081 . A larger value for DROE, hence, indicates greater losses in 2008 and greater 
risk-taking. Since tests indicate that STAKE is endogenous, we only report the results of Two-Stage Least Squares (IV) regressions. We test for endogeneity 
using STATA’s endog option. The null hypothesis is that the endogenous variable can be treated as exogenous. The test-statistic is reported at the bottom of 
Table 12. To control for heteroscedasticity, we use White-robust standard errors (White, 1980). The sample includes 1142 banks. Since data on banking 
regulation and supervision is not available for all countries, the number of observations in the regressions including other country characteristics is smaller than in 
the baseline model. For a complete list and a description of the variables used in the regression analysis see Table 7 and 8.  
                    Model 11                  Model 12                 Model 13                     Model 14 
                 Rule of Law            Regulatory Quality                 Corruption         Banking Market Structure 
  ROE DROE ROE DROE ROE DROE ROE DROE 
STAKE 0.00362*** 0.00349*** 0.00424*** 0.00382** 0.00373*** 0.00359*** 0.00213*** 0.00265** 
 (5.63) (2.82) (4.11) (2.11) (5.41) (2.74) (4.02) (2.04)
RIGHTS 0.0333*** 0.0438*** 0.0374*** 0.0462*** 0.0341*** 0.0458*** 0.0208*** 0.0240** 
 (5.66) (3.55) (4.16) (2.78) (5.42) (3.53) (4.88) (2.30)
HOLDING 0.135*** 0.162*** 0.159*** 0.174*** 0.139*** 0.166*** 0.0710*** 0.120** 
 (5.70) (3.55) (4.15) (2.64) (5.49) (3.47) (3.51) (2.33)
SAVINGS 0.0403*** 0.0729** 0.0451** 0.0756** 0.0413*** 0.0750** 0.0126 0.0687** 
 (2.63) (2.14) (2.48) (2.07) (2.62) (2.18) (1.05) (1.97)
COOPERATIVE 0.0928*** 0.0588 0.107*** 0.0665 0.0952*** 0.0606 0.0419** 0.0347 
 (3.85) (1.45) (3.22) (1.27) (3.78) (1.45) (2.13) (0.78)
INVESTMENT 0.0150 0.00748 0.0118 0.00605 0.0158 0.00995 0.0315 0.0308 
 (0.61) (0.14) (0.44) (0.11) (0.63) (0.19) (1.60) (0.59)
MORTGAGE 0.0117 -0.0272 0.0159 -0.0243 0.0147 -0.0201 -0.00673 -0.0225 
 (0.53) (-0.63) (0.60) (-0.52) (0.64) (-0.45) (-0.42) (-0.54) 
STATE-BANK -0.0523*** 0.000162 -0.0566*** -0.00166 -0.0519*** 0.00369 -0.0455*** 0.0207 
 (-2.91) (0.00) (-2.89) (-0.04) (-2.84) (0.08) (-3.11) (0.48)
RULE OF LAW -0.0220 -0.0100
 (-1.64) (-0.39)
REGULATORY QUALITY  -0.0369 -0.0198 
  (-1.26) (-0.38) 
CORRUPTION  -0.0215* -0.0208
  (-1.74) (-0.88)
DBAGDP  -0.0703*** 0.00727 
  (-5.02) (0.21)
C3  0.0538* -0.192** 
  (1.78) (-2.50) 
Observations 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 
F-test of excluded instruments 48.85*** 48.85*** 23.53*** 23.53*** 44.68*** 44.68*** 40.45*** 40.45*** 
Endogeneity test-statistic 58.89*** 15.10*** 47.38*** 8.843*** 59.10*** 14.34*** 25.55*** 8.08*** 
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1-/5-/10-% level. 
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Table 13: Further Robustness Checks and Model Extensions 
Table 13 presents the results of further robustness checks and model extensions. Columns 1 and 2 report the 
results of the baseline model including SMOOTHING. SMOOTHING is defined as one minus the ratio of 
the bank-level standard deviation of operating income divided by the bank-level standard deviation of cash 
flow operations between 2000 and 2006. Data on bank performance (ROE) and bank risk (DROE) comes 
from the Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk. DROE is defined as [ ]RoERoE −− 20081 . A larger value for 
DROE, hence, indicates greater losses in 2008. Since tests indicate that STAKE is endogenous, we only 
report the results of Two-Stage Least Squares (IV) regressions. We test for endogeneity using STATA’s 
endog option. The null hypothesis is that the endogenous variable can be treated as exogenous. The test-
statistic is reported at the bottom of Table 13. To control for heteroscedasticity, we use White-robust 
standard errors (White, 1980). The third column reports the results of an instrumental variables probit 
regression. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that is one if a bank received any kind of financial 
support from the government during the crisis and zero otherwise (GOVAID). For a complete list and a 
description of the variables used in the regression analysis see Table 7 and 8.  
 Model 15 Model 16 
 Profit Smoothing Instrumental Variables Probit 
  ROE DROE GOVAID 
STAKE 0.00366*** 0.00321** 0.02522*** 
 (5.37) (2.54) -0.008 
RIGHTS 0.0320*** 0.0407*** 0.268*** 
 (5.81) (3.60) (0.0611) 
HOLDING 0.133*** 0.152*** 2.055*** 
 (5.47) (3.33) (0.321) 
SAVINGS 0.0356** 0.0729** 0.118 
 (2.29) (2.15) (0.255) 
COOPERATIVE 0.0979*** 0.0508 0.785** 
 (3.81) (1.23) (0.348) 
INVESTMENT -0.000430 0.0280 -0.659* 
 (-0.02) (0.50) (0.339) 
MORTGAGE -0.000603 -0.0316 0.267 
 (-0.03) (-0.73) (0.278) 
STATE-BANK -0.0615*** -0.0226 0.109 
 (-3.33) (-0.49) (0.269) 
SMOOTHING2 -0.0629** -0.00706  
 (-2.03) (-0.13)  
Observations 1100 1100 1142 
F-test of excluded instruments 43.72*** 43.72***  
Endogeneity test-statistic 55.85*** 12.59***   
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1-/5-/10-% level. 
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Figure 1: Relationship between Bank Risk and Bank Performance  
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between bank performance and bank risk-taking. Bank performance is 
measured by the average return-on-equity (ROE) in the period between 2000 and 2006. Bank risk is 
measured by the drop-off in ROE in 2008 from the average ROE in the period between 2000 and 2006 
(DROE). To eliminate outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1- and 99-percent level. DROE is 
constructed in a way that a higher value for DROE indicates greater risk-taking. To make interpretation 
easier, we calculate the average ROE for every decile of the distribution. Hence, each dot reflects the 
combination of average bank performance in each decile and the corresponding average value for bank risk-
taking in the respective decile. ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1-/5-/10-percent level. 
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Correlation between DROE and ROE for the full sample: 0.2474*** 
 
